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THE TENANT'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION-PROPOSALS FOR
MODERNIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LANDLORD AND TENANT
[Uni'versty Communit

Propertiesv. New Ri'verside Cafe, 268 N.W.2d 573

(Minn. 1978)].
"But the law as to leases is not a matter of logic

in vacuao; it

is a matter of

history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."
Mr. Justice Holmes, for the Court, in
Gardiner v. Butler & Co., 245 U.S. 603,
605 (1918).
I.

INTRODUCTION

At common law, a tenant forfeited his entire estate in land for any act
that was inconsistent with his status as a tenant.' In response to this
harsh doctrine, courts of law and equity intervened to protect the tenant's interests and to prevent injustice.2 In Minnesota, the protection for
a tenant against forfeiture was established by the Territorial Legislature
in 1851.3 The 1851 law provided that a tenant could be restored to possession, despite a default for nonpayment of rent, if the tenant tendered
to the landlord the rent due and costs. 4 In effect, the statute codified

some of the common law practices and has remained substantially unchanged since its original enactment. 5 Since the enactment of the statute, however, landlord-tenant practices have changed significantly. In
Universiy Community Propertiesv. New Ri'verside Cafe6 (Cafe), the Minnesota
1. 2 J. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 488 (8th ed. 1887). Some of the acts inconsistent with being a tenant included: impugning the title of lessor; affirming, by record, that the fee interest in the land was in
someone other than the landlord; claiming a greater estate than entitled to; refusing to
pay rent and attorns to the landlord's successor in interest; or conveying the estate in such
a manner as to divest the reversioner. Id.

2. See id. § 495.
3. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 74, § 14 (1851) (current version at MINN. STAT.

§ 504.02 (1978)).
4.

See ia.

5. Compare MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 74, § 14 (1851) (reprinted in part at note 43
in/a) with MINN. STAT. § 504.02 (1978) (reprinted in part at note 21 in/fa).
6. 268 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1978). This case is apparently the product of the ongoing
landlord-tenant problems between University Community Properties, Inc. and the West
Bank Tenant's Union. Appellants' Brief and Appendix at 2 n.3. This Cedar Riverside
area landlord and tenant originally presented their grievances before the Minnesota
Supreme Court in University Community Properties, Inc. v. Norton, 311 Minn. 18, 246
N.W.2d 858 (1976). In the Noron decision, University Community Properties, Inc.
(UCPI), notified approximately 400 of its lessees, including the defendants, of a rent in-
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Supreme Court acknowledged that Minnesota's landlord-tenant statute
contemplates practices no longer common. 7 In a spirit of reform, the
Cafe court chose to read out of the statute some of the common law prerequisites necessary for redemption, but to retain others. As a result of
the Cafe decision, the application of the redemption statute has been substantially altered.
In the Cafe case, the plaintiff, University Community Propertiesa
(UCP), leased the first floor of a commercial building to the New Riverside Cafe9 (New Riverside). The lease was oral and provided the tenant
was to pay rent on a monthly basis. In October and November of 1977,
New Riverside refused to make the monthly payments.10 UCP notified
New Riverside that the lease would terminate at expiration of two weeks
for failure to pay rent.' t Shortly after the termination, UCP commenced
an unlawful detainer action 12 to recover possession of the premises.13
In the unlawful detainer proceeding, New Riverside argued that UCP
crease. The defendants and other tenants reacted by forming the West Bank Tenant's
Union. The tenant's union voted to withhold rent until a compromise schedule of rent
increases could be obtained from UCPI. Id. at 20, 246 N.W.2d at 859-60. Shortly after a
compromise schedule of rent increases had been agreed upon by the tenant's union and
the landlord, the union accused UCPI of violating the compromise agreement and began
to withhold rent. UCPI then filed unlawful detainer actions against the tenants participating in the "rent strike." The defendants asserted among their defenses that the landlord had breached the landlord-tenant's union agreement regulating rent increases. Id. at
20-21, 246 N.W.2d at 859-60. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that an unaggrieved
member of a tenant's union could not assert the breach of a landlord-tenant's union agreement as a defense to an unlawful detainer action. Id. at 26, 246 N.W.2d at 862.
7. 268 N.W.2d at 575.
8. University Community Properties, Inc. is the management agent of Cedar Riverside Land Company. Appellants' Brief and Appendix at 2. Cedar Riverside Land Company leases the land concerned in this action from Northwestern National Life Insurance
Company. Id. at 2 n.2, A-19 to -20.
9. New Riverside began renting the premises in 1972 for the operation of a vegetarian restaurant. Respondents' Brief and Appendix at 2.
10. See 268 N.W.2d at 574.
11. Id. This length of time was apparently chosen to satisfy the 14-day notice requirement necessary to terminate a tenancy at will for the nonpayment of rent. See MINN.
STAT. § 504.06 (1978).

12. The remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are embodied in chapter
566 of Minnesota Statutes. The heart of the unlawful detainer section is contained in
section 566.03 which dictates when the remedy is available. Section 566.03 provides:
Subdivision 1. When any person holds over lands or tenements after a sale
thereof on an execution or judgment, or on foreclosure of a mortgage and expiration of the time for redemption, or after termination of contract to convey the
same, or after termination of the time for which they are demised or let to him or
to the persons under whom he holds possession, or contrary to the conditions or
covenants of the lease or agreement under which he holds, or after any rent
becomes due according to the terms of such lease or agreement, or when any
tenant at will holds over after the determination of any such estate by notice to
quit, in all such cases the person entitled to the premises may recover possession
thereof in the manner hereinafter provided.
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had agreed to allow it to make repairs on the premises and offset the costs
against the rent payments.14 New RiversideSalso argued that the termination of the lease was in retaliation for its good faith efforts to enforce
rights under the lease and under Minnesota law.15 At the conclusion of a
four-day trial, the jury determined there was no agreement to reduce the
rent 16 and that any action New.Riverside had taken to enforce its rights
was not taken in good faith. 17 The trial court found that UCP was enti§ 566.03 (1978).
The remedy of unlawful detainer is a landlord's remedy. It cannot be used by a
tenant to evict his landlord. Berg v. Wiley, 303 Minn. 247, 249-51, 226 N.W.2d 904, 90607 (1975). The action for unlawful detainer has two purposes: first, to prevent those who
wish to contest the adverse possession of property from vindicating their interests by use of
force or violence, see, e.g., Keller v. Henvit, 219 Minn. 580, 585, 18 N.W.2d 544, 547 (1945)
(statute is "intended to prevent parties from taking the law into their own hands"); Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Berg, 187 Minn. 503, 505, 246 N.W. 9, 10 (1932) (same); Lobdell
v. Keene, 85 Minn. 90, 101, 88 N.W. 426, 430 (1901) (statute designed to prevent parties
from "redressing their own wrongs by entering into possession in a violent and forcible
manner"), and second, to give a timely remedy to those property owners whose right to
present possession has been wrongfully denied. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Jones, 72 Minn. 446,
446, 75 N.W. 701, 701 (1898) (purpose of statute "is to give a speedy remedy to those
whose possession has been invaded"). To achieve these purposes, the forcible entry and
unlawful detainer process has been construed to be summary in nature. See, e.g., Goldberg
v. Fields, 247 Minn. 213, 215, 76 N.W.2d 668, 669 (1956) ("The remedy which is provided
by the unlawful detainer statute is a summary one, and the mode of proceeding is the
essence of it."); Pushor v. Dale, 242 Minn. 564, 568, 66 N.W.2d 11, 14 (1954) ("Unlawful
detainer proceedings are summary in their nature ....
"); Pushor v. Dale, 240 Minn. 179,
180, 60 N.W.2d 128, 128 (1953) (per curiam) (same). Consequently, the scope of the process is the determination of the right to present possession, not an adjudication of title or of
the ultimate rights of the parties. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Fields, 247 Minn. at 215, 76
N.W.2d at 669 ("The judgment in such an action merely determines the right to the present possession of the property."); Pushor v. Dale, 242 Minn. at 568-69, 66 N.W.2d at 14
(such judgments are not "a bar in subsequent actions as to questions of title or other
equitable defenses"). To preserve the statute's summary nature, defenses and counterclaims have been severely restricted. See, e.g., Miller v. Benner, 293 Minn. 400, 402, 196
N.W.2d 293, 294 (1972) (per curiam) (oral agreement allowing defendant to retain possession of property not available in unlawful detainer action); Keller v. Henvit, 219 Minn. at
585, 18 N.W.2d at 547 (counterclaim not permitted); William Weisman Holding Co. v.
Miller, 152 Minn. 330, 332, 188 N.W. 732, 733 (1922) (same).
13. 268 N.W.2d at 574. For the contents of the complaint, see Appellants' Brief and
Appendix at A-1 to -3.
14. 268 N.W.2d at 574; Appellants' Brief and Appendix at A-4 to -10.
15. 268 N.W.2d at 574; Appellants' Brief and Appendix at A-4 to -10.
16. 268 N.W.2d at 574.
17. Id. The jury in this action was presented with a special verdict. The relevant
questions and responses stated as follows:
Question 1: Was there an agreement between the landlord and the New
Riverside Cafe that the cafe could make repairs and deduct the cost of those
repairs from the monthly rent?
Answer: No.
MINN. STAT.

Question 3: Did the defendant New Riverside Cafe, prior to the termination of its tenancy, take any actions designed to secure or enforce rights under its

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

tied to the premises unless New Riverside exercised its statutory right of
redemption.' 8 New Riverside paid the rent and statutory attorney's fees
to the court, and judgment was entered in favor of New Riverside. 19
On appeal, UCP argued that New Riverside could not redeem the
lease because UCP had chosen to terminate the agreement, leaving no
tenancy to which New Riverside could be restored. 20 Additionally, UCP
argued that New Riverside was not entitled to redeem its lease because
the tenant had not satisfied the statutory requirement of showing that
UCP had a right of reentry2 ' in the event of a default. 22 Although the
Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with UCP that the existence of a right
of reentry may have been a necessary condition for redemption when the
statute was enacted, the court decided the tenant's ability to redeem
should no longer be limited by requiring the presence of a reentry clause
in the lease.23 However, the court held that the redemption statute does
not apply to tenancies at will. Therefore, the court also agreed with
UCP that after the lease was terminated there was no longer a tenancy to
which New Riverside could be restored. 24 The trial court decision was
reversed.
This Comment will analyze how the Cafe decision has affected the redemption right of tenants under Minnesota law. The requirement that a
right of reentry must be reserved before a tenant can redeem his lease
and that the tenant of a periodic lease may not redeem his tenancy after
the lease has been terminated for the nonpayment of rent, will be exlease, or under the laws of the State of Minnesota, any of its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States?
Answer: Yes.
Question 4: If you answer Question 3 "yes," then answer this question:
Did the defendant New Riverside Cafe take that action in good faith?
Answer: No.
Appellants' Brief and Appendix at A-18.
18. 268 N.W.2d at 574.
19. Id.
20. Appellants' Brief and Appendix at 18-23.
21. Id. Minnesota's redemption statute, MINN. STAT. § 504.02 (1978), provides in
part:
In case of a lease of real property, when the landlordhas a subsitttng right of
reentry for the failure of the tenant to pay rent he may bring an action to recover
possession of the property and such action is equivalent to a demand for the rent
and a reentry upon the property; but if, at any time before possession has been
delivered to the plaintiff on recovery in the action, the lessee or his successor in
interest as to the whole or any part of the property pays to the plaintiff or brings
into court the amount of the rent then in arrears, with interest and costs of the
action, and an attorney's fee not exceeding $5, and performs the other covenants
on the part of the lessee, he may be restored to the possession and hold the property according to the terms of the original lease.
Id. (emphasis added).
22. 268 N.W.2d at 575.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 575-76.
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plored. 25 Next, the implications of the Cafe decision on current Minnesota law will be discussed.26 Finally, this Comment will propose
legislation creating a right of redemption for tenants of a periodic lease
and limiting the opportunities for abuse of the redemption right by tenants, thus reforming Minnesota's statute to reflect modern landlord-ten27
ant practice.
II.

THE RIGHT OF REENTRY AS A PREREQUISITE TO REDEMPTION

In the Cafe case, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that a tenant's
right of redemption was not limited to those situations in which the landlord has a right of reentry allowing the landlord to bring an ejectment
action. In so holding, however, the court read out of the redemption
statute a substantial requirement and, in effect, legislated a broader right
of redemption for tenants.
A.

The Common Law Onrins of the Right of Reentg

At common law, there existed no equivalent of a summary process for
the eviction of a tenant. 28 In fact, when a tenant defaulted on the payment of rent or otherwise disregarded the conditions of the lease, the
landlord could not legally enter the land during the continuance of the
tenancy. 29 This problem for landlords resulted from the fact that, as the
common law developed, a breach of the covenant to pay rent did not
work a forfeiture of the lease.30 Landlords could look only to actions for
damages, which typically left them with their remedy by distress 3 1 or an
25. See notes 28-118 ina and accompanying text.
26. See notes 119-38 infta and accompanying text.
27. See notes 139-61 infia and accompanying text.
28. See McGovern, Dependent Promises in the Hiftoy of Leases and Other Contracts, 52 TUL.
L. REV. 659, 665 (1978).
29. State v. Brown, 203 Minn. 505, 282 N.W. 136 (1938) (per curiam) (discussing
question of whether landlord can enter premises after tenant defaults in rent); Woodcock
v. Carlson, 41 Minn. 542, 544-45, 43 N.W. 479, 480 (1889); J. ADAMS, A TREATISE ON
THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE ACTION OF EJECTMENT AND THE RESULTING

ACTION FOR MESNE PROFITS 145-46 (1812). In Brown the court aptly explained the common law rule in the following manner:
The tenant was regarded as the purchaser of an estate. He was obligated to pay
rent as much as if he had bought a suit of clothes or a horse to be paid for by
instalments. Clearly, the tailor could not repossess the suit upon default unless
the right were reserved. Likewise, the landlord cannot retake possession of the
premises when the tenant defaults unless he reserves the right.
203 Minn. at 507, 282 N.W. at 137.
30. Woodcock v. Carlson, 41 Minn. 542, 544, 43 N.W. 479, 480 (1889).
31. Distress is a remedy for the collection of rent that allows the landlord to take
goods or chattels on the leasehold that belong to the tenant and then sell the goods, applying the proceeds to the debt of rent. See generally 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF LANDLORD
AND TENANT §§ 325-346 (1910). The remedy of distress has been abolished in Minnesota.
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32
action to collect rent.

When the value of tenancies increased, however, landlords began to
search for remedies that would allow them to recover possession of the
leasehold in the event of a default.33 Eventually, it became common
practice for landlords to insert in their leases a proviso declaring the forfeiture of a lease if the rent remained unpaid for a certain length of time
and empowering the landlord physically to reenter 34 and reoccupy the
leasehold. 3 5 This proviso, authorizing the immediate right to possession,
entitled landlords to use self-help to recover the leasehold 36 or to main37
tain an action for ejectment.
The availability of these remedies to landlords provided little aid in
MINN. STAT. § 504.01 (1978).

For a discussion of distress as it existed in Minnesota, see
Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584 (1877).
32. Woodcock v. Carlson, 41 Minn. 542, 544,43 N.W. 479, 480 (1889); see McGovern,
supra note 28, at 665.33. See J. ADAMS, supra note 29, at 145-46.
34. Id. At common law, an actual reentry was ordinarily required in order to terminate freehold interests. The reason offered most often to explain this practice was that the
estate was commenced with a formal act, livery of seisin; thus, it could be terminated only
with an act of equal formality. 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 31, § 194, at 1401.
35. See J. ADAMS, supra note 29, at 146. Typically the leases allowed landlords to
reenter the land upon the breach by the tenant of some particular covenant or covenants.
The reentry clause was treated as a condition in the lease to be read in conjunction with
the particular covenant to which it referred. 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 31, § 194, at 1366.
36. See 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1368 (1959).
37. The common law remedy of ejectment is a civil action to which a party may
resort to recover possession of a premises. The party claiming possession of the land recovers on his general right of entry, whether the title is in the complete estate (in fee) or in an
estate less than a freehold (a tenancy). 2 J. TAYLOR, supra note 1, § 698. The action in
ejectment was originally devised to provide a remedy to a lessee with a term for years, who
was ousted from possession of his leasehold. Tenants with a term for years could not
utilize real property actions because their interest in land was considered to be only a
chattel interest. Sturdy v. Jackaway, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 174, 175-76 (1866). Initially the
action was merely one of trespass, and the remedy was only for damages. Eventually,
however, the courts determined the lessee should also be allowed to recover his term and
the action was manipulated so that the tenant was allowed to dispossess the party occupying the property. See id. at 176. The action for ejectment came into general use by freeholders to dispossess a party in possession through the allegation of a fictitious lease. See A.
CASNER & W. LEAcH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 269 (2d ed. 1969). Plucknett
described the use of legal fictions in the ejectment action during the later 17th Century in
the following manner:
When two parties wished to try the title to a piece of land, one of them leased it
to an imaginary person (John Doe), and the other similarly leased to another
(William Styles). One lessee ejects the other (this will be all fiction), and in order
to try the rights of the rival lessees the court has to enter into the question of the
rights of the lessors. . . . The nominal plaintiff in such actions was the fictitious
John Doe on the demise of the real plaintiff; and so an action which to-day
would be called A v. B used to be described as Doe d, A (that is, Doe on the
demise of A) v. B. The fictitious William Styles was usually replaced by his
lessor, for in earlier proceedings the plaintiff's solicitor writes a letter to the de-
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recovering possession of a leasehold. Over time, self-help reentry became
objectionable to society and inconvenient for landlords.38 Laws eventually restricted or foreclosed the use of force by a landlord to dispossess a
tenant. 3 9 Ejectment actions also proved to be ineffective. The highly
technical procedures necessary to satisfy the requirements of an action in
ejectment 4o allowed the tenant to hold the premises for long periods of
fendant in the name of "your loving friend, William Styles", asking the defendant to defend Styles's interest.
T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 374 (5th ed. 1956) (emphasis in original).
Ejectment as it was known at common law was rejected in Minnesota. Doyle v. Hallam, 21 Minn. 515, 516 (1875). Actions in the nature of ejectment are now provided for
by MINN. STAT. § 559.01 (1978). That section provides in part:
Any person in possession of real property by himself or his tenant, or any
person having or claiming title to vacant or unoccupied real property, may bring
an action against any person who claims an estate or interest therein, or a lien
thereon, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim and
the rights of the parties, respectively.
Id. Although most of the fictitious allegations associated with the action have disappeared, the basic nature of the action has been preserved by case law: a plaintiff may
recover possession only on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of his
adversary's. Levine v. Twin City Red Barn No. 2, Inc., 296 Minn. 260, 263, 207 N.W.2d
739, 741 (1973) (per curiam); Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Johnson, 94 Minn. 150, 152,
102 N.W. 381, 382 (1905). Inasmuch as ejectment remains a possessory action, the plaintiff is still required to show a right of possession that is immediate, and legal estate in the
property sought to be recovered. Levine v. Twin City Red Barn No. 2, Inc., 296 Minn. at
263, 207 N.W.2d at 741.
38. See Woodcock v. Carlson, 41 Minn. 542, 544-45, 43 N.W. 479, 480 (1889).
39. Laws began restricting the ability of landlords to forcibly dispossess tenants under
the Forcible Entry Act of 1381. See Comment, Defects in the Current Forcible Ent and Detather Laws of the United States and England, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1067, 1070 (1978). This
early act, however, was not effective in controlling the violent entrys onto land and Parliament was required to pass a number of statutes to strengthen the law. Id. The use of selfhelp reentry by a landlord has been limited in Minnesota to those instances in which a
tenant has surrendered or abandoned the leasehold. See Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145,
151 (Minn. 1978), notedin 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 535 (1979).
40. A typical example of the highly technical aspects of ejectment can be illustrated
by looking at the requirements surrounding the preliminary matter of making a demand
for the rent.
First, a demand of the rent must be made, either in person, or by an agent properly authorised. (b) Secondly, the demand must be of the precise rent due; for if
he demands a penny more, or less, it will be ill. Thirdly, it must be made precisely
upon the day when the rent is due, and payable, by the lease, to save the forfeiture;
as, where the proviso is, "that if the rent shall be behind and unpaid, by the
space of thirty, or any other number of days after the day of payment, it shall be
unlawful for the lessor to re-enter," a demand must be made on the thirtieth, or
other last day. Fourthly, it must be made a convenient time before sun-set.
Fifthly, it must be made upon the land, and at the most notorious place of it.
Therefore, if there be a dwelling-house upon the land, the demand must be at
the front or fore door, though it is not necessary to enter the house, notwithstanding the door be open; but if the tenant meet the lessor, either on or off the
land, at any trene of the last day of payment, and tender the rent, it is sufficient to
save a forfeiture, for the law leans against forfeitures. Sixthly, unless a place is
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time under color of title.41 Even when a tenant had been evicted, courts

of equity could restore the tenant to possession according to the terms of
the original lease.42
B.

The Right of Reenty Requirement in Minnesota Law

Apparently cognizant of the defects in the common law, the drafters of
Minnesota's territorial statutes attempted to codify the action of ejectment without all of its formalities and provide landlords with other
methods to regain possession of leased property. 43 Under the statute, an
action to recover possession of the property was the equivalent of the
44
common law demand for rent and physical reentry upon the property.
appointed where the rent is payable, in which case the demand must be made at
such place. Seventhly, a demand of the rent must be made in fact, although
there should be no person on the land ready to pay it.(c)
J. ADAMS, supra note 29, at 149 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
41. See 2 J. TAYLOR, supra note 1, § 713.
42. See J.

ADAMS,

supra note 29, at 149-50.

43. Chapter 74 of the 1851 Minnesota Revised Territorial Statutes provided in part:
Sec. 1. An action may be brought by any person in possession, by himself or
his tenant of real property, against any person who claims an estate or interest
therein, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, estate
or interest.
Sec. 14. When in case of a lease of real property, and the failure of the
tenant to pay rent, the landlord has a substituting right to re-enter for such failure, he may bring an action to recover possession of the property, and such action is equivalent to a demand of the rent and a re-entry upon the property; but
if at any time before the expiration of six months after possession obtained by the
plaintiff on recovery in the action, the lessee or his successor in interest, as to the
whole or of part of the property, pay to the plaintiff, or bring into court the
amount of rent then in arrear, with interest and the costs of the action, and
perform the other covenants on the part of the lessee, he may be restored to the
possession, and hold the property according to the terms of the original lease.
MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 1, 14 (1851) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 504.02

(1978)).
44. Id. This provision of the statute appears to have been modeled after an early New
York statute which provided:
[I]f the landlord has a subsisting right by law to re-enter for the non-payment of
such rent, he may bring an action of ejectment for the recovery of the possession
of the demised premises; and the service of the declaration therein shall be
deemed, and stand instead of, a demand of the rent in arrear, and of a re-entry
on the demised premises.
N.Y. REV. STAT. part 3, ch. 8, tit. 9, art. 2, § 30 (1827-1828) (footnote omitted) (repealed
1880).

This statute in turn, appears to have been modeled after an early English statute:
[In all Cases between Landlord and Tenant . . . , as often as it shall happen
that one half Year's Rent shall be in Arrear, and the Landlord or Lessor, to
whom the same is due, hath Right by Law to re-enter for the Nonpayment
thereof, such Landlord or Lessor shall and may, without any formal Demand or
Re-entry, serve a Declaration in Ejectment for the Recovery of the demised
Premises, or in case the same cannot be legally served, or no Tenant be in Actual
Possession of the Premises, then to affix the same upon the Door of any demised
Messuage, or in case such Ejectment shall not be for the Recovery of any Mes-
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The statute also limited the tenant's period of redemption to six months
after possession of the premises was obtained by the landlord. 4 5 The
landlord, however, was still required to have a right of reentry as a condi46
tion precedent to an ejectment action.
In addition to eliminating some of the formalities surrounding the action of ejectment, the Territorial Legislature adopted the landlord's remedy of unlawful detainer.47 The remedy of unlawful detainer was
suage, then upon some notorious Place of the Lands, Tenements or Hereditaments, comprized in such Declaration in Ejectment, and such Affixing shall be
deemed legal Service thereof, which Service or Affixing such Declaration in
Ejectment, shall stand in the Place and Stead of a Demand and Re-entry; and in
case of Judgment against the casual Ejector, or Nonsuit for not confessing Lease,
Entry and Ouster, it shall be made appear to the Court where the said Suit is
depending, by Affidavit, or be proved upon the Trial, in case the Defendant
appears, that halfa Year's Rent was due before the said Declaration was served,
and that no sufficient Distress was to be found on the demised Premises, countervailing the Arrears then due, and that the Lessor or Lessors in Ejectment had
Power to re-enter; then and in every such Case the Lessor or Lessors in Ejectment
shall recover Judgment and Execution, in the same Manner as if the Rent in
Arrear had been legally demanded, and a Re-entry made ....
An Act for the more effectual preventing Frauds committed by Tenants, and for the more
easy Recovery of Rents, and Renewal of Leases, 1731, 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, § 2.
45. MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 74, § 14 (1851) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 504.02 (1978)). For the full text of this section, see note 43 supra. This provision of the
statute appears to have been modeled after an early New York statute:
At any time within six months after the possession of the demised premises
shall have been taken by the landlord, under any execution issued upon ajudgment obtained by him, in any such action of ejectment, the lessee of such demised premises, his assigns or personal representatives, may pay or tender to the
lessor, his personal representatives or attorney, or into court where the suit shall
be pending, all the rent in arrear at the time of such payment, and all costs and
charges incurred by the lessor; and in such case, all further proceedings in the
said cause shall cease, and such premises shall be restored to the lessee, who shall
hold and enjoy the demised premises, without any new lease thereof, according
to the terms of the original demise.
N.Y. REV. STAT. part 3, ch. 8, tit. 9, art. 2, § 33 (1827-1828) (footnote omitted) (repealed
1880).
46. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
47. Chapter 87, section 12 of the 1851 Minnesota Revised Territorial Statutes provided in part:
When any person shall hold over any lands, tenements, or other possessions,
after the termination of the'time for which they are demised or let to him, or her,
or to the person under whom he or she holds possession, or contrary to the conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement, under which he.or she holds, or
after any rent shall have become due, according to the terms of such lease or
agreement, and shall remain unpaid for the space of three days. . . if the lessor,
. . .shall make demand in writing of such tenants, that he or she shall deliver
possession of the premises . . . and if such tenant shall refuse or neglect, for the
space of three days after such demand, to quit the possession of such lands or
tenements, or to pay rent. . . upon complaint thereof to any justice of the peace
of the proper county, the justice shall proceed to*hear, try, and determine the
same. . ..
MINN. REV. TERR. STAT.

ch. 87, § 12 (1851) (current version at

MINN. STAT.

§ 566.03

(1978).
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without an identifiable ancestor at common law. 48 Unlawful detainer

provided summary action on one of three separate grounds: when the
tenant held over after termination of the time for which the premises
were demised or let to the tenant; when the tenant held over contrary to
the conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which he
held the premises; or when the tenant held over after any rent became
due according to the terms of the lease agreement. 49 The action provided landlords with a right to recover possession of a premises regardless
of a power of reentry. 50 If the landlord demanded payment in writing
three days after the time the rent became due, and if the tenant neglected to pay the rent for a period of three days after receipt of the
notice, the statute allowed the landlord to recover possession of the premises.51 Significantly, unlawful detainer, unlike the ejectment action, did
not provide a right of redemption for tenants to recover possession of
52
their leaseholds.
Thus, some important differences existed between the statutory actions
of ejectment and unlawful detainer. A party suing in ejectment could
recover possession and damages, while a party using the remedy of unlawful detainer could only recover possession.5 3 The action in ejectment
provided for a full trial on the merits, 54 while the remedy of unlawful
48. See McGovern, supra note 28, at 665.
49. See note 47 supra. A fourth ground was subsequently added in 1866. It provided
relief in the event the tenant held over after the determination of any estate at will by
notice to quit. See MINN. REV. STAT. ch. 84, § 11 (1866) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 566.03 (1978)).
50. See State v. Brown, 203 Minn. 505, 507, 282 N.W. 136, 137 (1938) (per curiam)
(landlord now has "efficient, summary remedy which in this state can be brought, although there has been no reservation of a right to re-Enter"); Seeger v. Smith, 74 Minn.
279, 281, 77 N.W. 3, 3 (1898) (the unlawful detainer statute "gives the right of restitution
against a tenant holding over after default in the payment of rent, whether the lease contains a re-entry clause or not"); Suchaneck v. Smith, 45 Minn. 26, 27, 47 N.W. 397, 397
(1890) (same); Woodcock v. Carlson, 41 Minn. 542, 546, 43 N.W. 479, 480-81 (1889)
(same).
51. See note 47 supra. The waiting period has since been abolished by statute as the
statute has gradually become landlord oriented. Compare MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 87,
§ 12 (1851) (reprinted in part at note 47 supra) with MINN. STAT. § 566.03 (1978) (reprinted in part at note 12 supra). Statutes in other jurisdictions have retained this waiting
period before the remedy of unlawful detainer becomes available. See statutes cited-in
note 139 infa.
52. Compare MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 74, § 14 (1851) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 504.02 (1978)) with MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 87, § 12 (1851) (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 566.03 (1978)). These statutes are reprinted respectively in notes 43 and
47 supra.
53. See State v. District Court, 53 Minn. 483, 486-87, 55 N.W. 630, 631 (1893) (landlord who pursues the summary remedy of unlawful detainer temporarily waives his right
to recover damages for the wrongful detention).
54. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 74, § 1 (1851) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 504.02 (1978)) ("action may be brought by any person in possession, by himself or his
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detainer provided only a summary disposition of the present right to possession.55 Moreover, the action in ejectment provided the evicted party
with the right to redeem if the landlord had the power of reentry. 56 The
remedy of unlawful detainer, on the other hand, was silent as to the ten57
ant's power to redeem.
Despite the differences that existed in the two remedies, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found at a comparatively early date that the right of
redemption available to tenants in ejectment actions was also available
to tenants evicted through unlawful detainer proceedings. In George v.
Mfahoney,58 a landlord leased a hotel to the tenant for a term of five
years. 59 The rent reserved in the lease was payable monthly in advance.
Two years after the creation of the lease, the tenant defaulted in the rent
and the landlord brought an unlawful detainer action to evict the tenant.
The day following the commencement of the action, the tenant tendered
to the landlord all back rent, interest, and attorney's fees, but the landlord refused to accept the tender. 60 On these compelling facts, the George
court ruled that the right of redemption available to tenants in ejectment
actions
extended to tenants evicted through unlawful detainer proceedings. 6 '
tenant of real property, against any person who claims an estate or interest therein, adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, estate of interest"). In
fact, at one time any party against whom judgment had been rendered could within six
months after written notice of the judgment demand a second trial. MINN. REV. TERR.
STAT. ch. 74, § 5 (1851) (repealed 1911); see Gahre v. Berry, 79 Minn. 20, 21, 81 N.W. 537,
537 (1900) (per curiam) (in actions for recovery of real estate, statute granting second trial
as of right is remedial and is to be liberally construed).
55. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Fields, 247 Minn. 213, 215, 76 N.W.2d 668, 669 (1956) (remedy provided by unlawful detainer statute is a summary one and such action merely determines right to present possession of property in dispute); Pushor v. Dale, 242 Minn. 564,
568, 66 N.W.2d 11, 14 (1954) (proceedings are summary in nature, designed-to restore to
owner prompt possession of premises); Leifman v. Percansky, 186 Minn. 427, 429-30, 243
N.W. 446, 447-48 (1932) ("statutory action to recover leased premises because of nonpayment of rent is a summary proceeding, involving only the present right to the possession of
the premises"); Strand v. Hand, 178 Minn. 460, 463, 227 N.W. 656, 657 (1929) (proceedings are summary and judgment determines right to present possession); Lilienthal v.
Tordoff, 154 Minn. 225, 227, 194 N.W. 722, 722 (1922) (per curiam) (unlawful detainer is
designed to be summary); William Weisman Holding Co. v. Miller, 152 Minn. 330, 332,
188 N.W. 732, 732-33 (1922) (remedy under unlawful detainer statute is summary in nature and merely determines right to present possession).
56. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
58. 62 Minn. 370, 64 N.W. 911 (1895).
59. See Paper Book and Appellant's Assignment of Errors at 2, George v. Mahoney,
62 Minn. 370, 64 N.W. 911 (1895).
60. See id. at 2-3.
61. See George v. Mahoney, 62 Minn. at 371, 64 N.W. at 911. Without discussing
prior case law, the court found that the statutory action for holding over was governed
and regulated by other statutory provisions and therefore:
[A] defaultitig tenant, against whom an action has been brought by his landlord,
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In George, however, the landlord had the power to reenter the premises.62 Thus, even though the court made the statutory redemption right
applicable to defendant, the court appears to have retained the requirement, rooted in the ejectment statute, that redemption is available only
when the landlord has reserved a right of reentry. 63 Accordingly, in

every appellate decision since George, the supreme court has found a right
of redemption only in cases in which the landlord had a right of reentry.6 4

C

The Impact of the Cafe Decision on Minnesota Law

In the Cafe case, New Riverside sought to redeem its leasehold, in spite
of the fact that UCP had not reserved a right of reentry. 65 Although the
historical derivation of the redemption statute 66 and the cases interpreting it67 would appear to make redemption under these facts unwarranted, the supreme court determined that the redemption remedy
would not be limited to situations in which a right of reentry was presand who has been evicted, is entitled to be restored to possession, and to thereafter hold the premises in accordance with the original terms of the lease, upon
paying to the landlord, or upon bringing into court, at any time within six
months after eviction, the amount of rent in arrears, with interest and the costs
of action.
Id. at 370-71, 64 N.W. at 911.
62. See Paper Book and Appellant's Assignment of Errors at 3, George v. Mahoney,
62 Minn. 370, 64 N.W. 911 (1895). The lease contained a nonforfeiting clause which
provided that if:
the party of the second part. . . . fail[s] to make the above mentioned payments
as herein specified, or to pay any of the rent when due, . . . . then it shall be
lawful for the said party of the first part . . . . to re-enter and take full and
absolute possession of the above rented premises and hold and enjoy the same
fully and absolutely, without such re-entry working a forfeiture of the rents to be
paid . . . . for the full term of this lease.
Id.
63. See George v. Mahoney, 62 Minn. 370, 64 N.W. 911 (1895); Appellants' Brief and
Appendix at 16-17, University Community Properties v. New Riverside Cafe, 268 N.W.2d
573 (Minn. 1978).
64. See 614 Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 297 Minn. 395, 397, 211 N.W.2d 891, 893-94
(1973); First Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 185 Minn. 121, 132, 240 N.W.
459, 464 (1931); Central Union Trust Co. v. Blank, 168 Minn. 312, 314-15, 210 N.W. 34,
35 (1926); Wacholz v. Griesgraber, 70 Minn. 220, 221-23, 73 N.W. 7, 7-8 (1897); Cook v.
Parker, 67 Minn. 374, 378, 69 N.W. 1099, 1100 (1897); Record, at 63-66, Paust v. Georgian, 147 Minn. 149, 179 N.W. 735 (1920). In Seeger v. Smith, 74 Minn. 279, 77 N.W. 3
(1898), one issue before the court was whether a tenant had a right to redeem his leasehold
although the landlord had no right of reentry. Id. at 281, 77 N.W. at 3. On review,
however, the supreme court resolved the case on the grounds that the tenant had not
properly tendered the rent and costs of the action to the landlord. Id.
65. 268 N.W.2d at 575 (UCP argued that New Riverside had no right of redemption
under statute because UCP had no right of reentry under lease).
66. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 64 supra.
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ent. 68 The court noted that the statute required the landlord to hold a
right of reentry before the tenant was able to redeem. 69 The court reasoned, however, that the right of reentry is.no longer commonly used by
landlords and the ability of a tenant to redeem his leasehold should not
turn on the existence of the clause. 70 Thus, the Cafe decision extends to
tenants for years the right of redemption without regard to whether the
landlord has a right of reentry sufficient for an ejectment action.71
III.

THE NATURE OF THE TENANCY AT WILL AS A BAR TO
REDEMPTION

In addition to considering the necessity of a reentry clause as a prerequisite to redemption, the Cafe court also considered the nature of the
tenancy at will as a bar to redemption. Although the tenancy at will
shares many of the characteristics of a tenancy for years, the court found
the right of redemption was not available to the tenant at will. 72 The
qualities of the estate at will and the supreme court's refusal to extend
the right of redemption to tenants holding this estate will be discussed in
the following sections.
A.

Tenancies at Common Law

At common law, a tenant could rightfully hold land as a tenant for
years or as a tenant at will. 73 The tenancy for years was an estate in land
68. See 268 N.W.2d at 575.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. At common law, estates of land less than a freehold were classified into three types
of tenancies: tenancies at sufferance, tenancies for years, and the tenancy at will. 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140 (1765).
A tenancy at sufferance, according to Blackstone, resulted when a tenant came into
possession of land by lawful title, but retained possession of the land without it. Id. at 150.
A definition similar to Blackstone's was proposed by Lord Coke. See 1 E. COKE, THE
FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND § 72 (1628) ("A Tenant at
Sufferance is he that at the first came in by lawfull Demise, and after his estate ended
continueth the possession and wrongfully holdeth over."). Possession of land by the tenant
at sufferance, however, was regarded as wrongful. Id. In fact, Lord Coke did not regard
the tenant at sufferance as having a freehold estate. Id. Tiffany has suggested: "'tenancy
at sufferance' was merely a convenient name employed to designate this person, who was

not a trespasser and not a disseisor, who was in possession and yet held of nobody."

1 H.

TIFFANY, supra note 31, § 15, at 149.

The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted and applied Blackstone's definition of an
estate at sufferance. Thompson v. Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 124, 119 N.W. 797, 798 (1909)
(tenancy at sufferance arises when tenant wrongfully holds over after expiration of lease);
see Wiedemann v. Brown, 140 Minn. 33, 41, 250 N.W. 724, 727 (1933) (tenancy at sufferance arises when person wrongfully holds over after expiration of his tenancy or after his
estate of right has ended).
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with an agreement for termination at a fixed date. 74 The tenant for
years enjoyed substantially the same rights as a freeholder in the land he
possessed. 75 The tenant at will, however, did not enjoy the stability in
his estate that characterized the tenancy for years. The tenant at will
rightfully held possession of the leasehold, 76 but the tenancy could be
terminated by any act of the landlord or tenant indicating an intention
to put an end to the tenancy. 77 Consequently, the tenant at will enjoyed
few of the rights of a freeholder with respect to his land. 78
Early in the history of the common law, courts began to limit the ability of a party to a tenancy at will to terminate the lease in a wanton
manner or contrary to principles of equity. 79 At first courts required a
reasonable period of notice to terminate the tenancy.8 0 Because both
courts and landlords were uncertain as to what notice was "reasonable,"
a time period of six months was eventually adopted as the notice period
for a tenancy at will that was considered to exist from year to year.8 1
Courts determined whether the tenancy existed from year to year8 2 or for
a different period of time by evaluating the characteristics of the lease,
74. See Seabloom v. Krier, 219 Minn. 362, 367, 18 N.W.2d 88, 91 (1945) (estate for
years is a lease that provides a fixed duration); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 143
("[elvery estate which must expire at a period certain and prefixed").
Because the lease fixes a definite day of termination, however, the tenant for years is
not entitled to a notice to quit. See Anderson v. Ries, 222 Minn. 408, 415-16, 24 N.W.2d
717, 721 (1946) (statutory notice to quit unnecessary when lease is terminable upon happening of event or lapse of particular period); Engels v. Mitchell, 30 Minn. 122, 124, 14
N.W. 510, 511 (1883) (tenancy for fixed term expired without notice); Peterson v. McCarney, 254 N.W.2d 438, 443 (N.D. 1977) (lease is terminated by expiration of tenancy
term without notice unless required by statute).
75. See 1 E. WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
291-92 (1860).
76. 1 E. COKE, supra note 73, § 72 ("tenant at will is always by right").
77. 1 E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 371-72; see 1 E. COKE, supra note 73, § 68.
Lord Coke explained the manner of recovering a tenancy at will in the following terms:
There is an expresse ouster, and implied ouster, an expresse, as when the Lessor
commeth upon the land, and expressly forewarneth the Lessee to occupie the
ground no longer; an implied, as if the Lessor without the consent of the Lessee
enter into the land and cut downe a tree, this is a determination of the will, for
that it should otherwise be a wrong in him, unlesse the trees were eccepted, and
then it is no determination of the will, for then the act is lawfull albeit the will
doth continue.
Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
78. See generally 1 E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 372-74.
79. Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 4, 49 NW. 327, 328 (1891); see 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 73, at 145-47.
80. Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 4, 49 N.W. 327, 328 (1891).
81. See id. (Because of the uncertainty of this rule, courts adopted a fixed period of six
months as reasonable notice for tenancies that were construed as tenancies from year to
year.); 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 146-47.
82. The tenancy for years, and the tenancy from year to year describe different terms
in the law of landlord and tenant. The origin of the terms was researched by Professor
McAdam who found:

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss2/4

14

et al.: The Tenant's Right of Redemption—Proposals for Modernizing the Re

1980]

THE TENANT'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

such as when payments of rent were due.8 3 When the common law court

found the lease to be for a period of time less than a year, the rule was
that the length of notice was to be equal to the period of time between
payments of rent.8 4 In the process of gaining a more certain duration,
the estate at will gradually acquired many of the qualities associated
with the tenancy for years. 8 5 The tenancy at will became a tenancy for a
The manner in which the terms "tenant for years" and "from year to year"
have been handed down to us, has somewhat obscured the present meaning of
those terms. Thus Blackstone says: "If the leave be but for half a year, or a
quatre, or any less time, this lessee is respected as a tenant for years, and is styled
so in some legal proceedings; a year being the shortest term which the law in this
case takes notice of." (2 Blacks. Comm. 140). But the term tenant "from year to
year" owes its origin to the disposition of the courts to convert tenancies "from
year to year", wherever an annual rent was reserved, or circumstances appeared
from which an annual holding might be implied. The precariousness of a holding terminable at will, induced this liberal construction.
I D. McADAM, LANDLORD AND TENANT 135 (5th ed. 1934). See generaly note 92 infha.
83. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at 147; see Polite v. Michigan Tae Kwin Do
Ass'n, 17 Mich. App. 580, 584, 170 N.W.2d 184, 187 (1969) (reservation of annual rent
payment is an important element in determination of intent of parties as to nature of
tenancy); cf. Foster v. National Tea Co., 74 N.D. 37, 41, 19 N.W.2d 760, 763-64 (1945)
(fact that negotiations for new lease commenced once every year "is more persuasive as to
the intentions of the parties than the fact that the rental was paid monthly, for whatever
the term, the rent in all proVability would have been paid monthly").
84. Thus, if rent was to be paid on a monthly basis, a one month notice was required
to terminate the tenancy and the tenancy would not expire until the end of the notice
period. Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 4, 49 N.W. 327, 328 (1891) (notice to equal interval
between times of payment of rent); see, e.g., Johnson v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 213
Minn. 12, 16, 4 N.W.2d 778, 780 (1942) (absent agreement to the contrary, month to
month tenancy can only be terminated by one month's notice directed to end of month),
overmled on other grounds, Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 507, 105 N.W.2d 244, 247
(1960) (overruled to extent that case might be interpreted as meaning only actual knowledge of defects on leased premises is a prerequisite to liability of landlord); Oesterreicher v.
Robertson, 187 Minn. 497, 498, 245 N.W. 825, 825 (1932) (time of notice should be governed by intervals between payment of rent and be equal to one interval); Hartnip v.
Fields, 247 Wis. 473, 475, 19 N.W.2d 878, 879 (1945). For an exhaustive treatment of the
computation of notice necessary to terminate a tenancy, see Annot., 86 A.L.R. 1346
(1933).
85. Holdsworth describes the development of the tenancy from year to year in the
following paragraph:
It was in the course of the sixteenth century that the estate from year to year
made its appearance. The creation of these estates, rather than estates at will,
was probably due to the inconvenience of estates at will. The tenant at will had
no certain interest; and his right to emblements made the land of very little value
to the landlord, who was practically deprived of the rent of the land while this
right to emblements lasted. It was better, both from the point of view of the
tenant and the landlord, that the tenant should have a better defined interest.
From the point of view of the tenant, because he had a more assured position;
and from the point of view of the landlord, because he was entitled to rent at the
end of the term. These causes led landowners to create tenancies from year to
year rather than tenancies at will. Both for these reasons, and also perhaps because it was in accordance with the agricultural policy of the state to encourage
agriculture by keeping tenants on the land, the courts began to favour these
tenancies; and, for these reasons, to presume that a tenancy from year to year
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fixed period of time once notice to terminate was given.86 The tenancy
could be passed at death,8a pleaded as a term,88 or assigned. 89 Moreover,
the tenant acquired rights similar to those of a tenant for years against
the landlord and against third parties. 90
As a result of the operation of judicial decisions, the tenancy at will, as
it existed at early common law, was almost extinguished.9 l In the place
of the early tenancy at will, periodic tenancies92 came into use by comwas intended, and not a tenancy at will, whenever a tenant entering upon or
remaining in possession of premises, paid for rent therefor. Thus tenancies from
year to year arose not only by express creation, but also by presumption of law.
7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 243-44 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
86. Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 5, 49 N.W. 327, 329 (1891); 1 E. WASHBURN, supra
note 75, at 384.
87. See I E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 384.
88. See Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 5, 49 N.W. 327, 329 (1891). For a thorough
discussion of a "term" see I.H. TIFFANY, supra note 31, § 12, at 45-48.
89. See id.; I E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 384.
90. See I E. WASHBURN, supra note 75, at 384.
91. Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 4, 49 N.W. 327, 328 (1891) (courts imposed reasonable notice requirements and the "result was that at common law estates at will, in the
strict sense, became almost extinguished at a very early date"); see Shirk v. Hoffman, 57
Minn. 230, 230, 58 N.W. 990, 990 (1894) (tenancies at will at common law were not
favored).
92. Tiffany related the term "periodic tenancy" to the other terms used to describe
the tenancy at will once notice requirements were required to terminate the estate:
The expression "periodic tenancy" is a convenient designation for all tenancies which are in their nature such as will endure for a certain period, and will
continue for subsequent successive periods of the same length, unless terminated
by due notice, at the end either of the first period or one of the succeeding periods. The typical tenancy of this character is that from "year to year," but the
essential qualities of a tenancy from "quarter to quarter," "from month to
month," or "from week to week," are the same.
Such a tenancy is occasionally spoken of as a "yearly," "quarterly,"
"monthly," or "weekly" tenancy, or as a "by the" year, quarter, month or week.
These expressions can, however, not be regarded as technically accurate, and are
to be avoided as tending to confuse such a tenancy with a tenancy for years,
which will continue for the period named, whether one or more years, a quarter,
a month, or a week ...
In some states a tenancy apparently such as is ordinarily referred to as a
tenancy from year to year is referred to as a "tenancy at will from year to year,"
or less frequently as a "tenancy at will," in recognition, it would seem, of the fact
that either party may terminate it at his will at the end of any year by giving the
previous legal notice. The expression "tenancy at will from month to month" is
also to be found. Occasionally, a periodic tenancy has been regarded as within a
provision of a statute referring in terms to a "tenancy at will." Occasionally,
while applying the term tenancy at will to both classes of tenancies, that is, what
we have previously discussed under the name of tenancy at will and also what we
are now discussing under the name of tenancy from year to year, courts or text
writers have undertaken to distinguish between the two by calling the first
"strict" tenancy at will and the second "general" tenancy at will. While the first
appellation is not inappropriate, it emphasizing the fact that this tenancy is
"strictly" in accordance with the common-law conception of a tenancy at will,
the term "general" as applied to a tenancy seems in no way suggestive of the
peculiar characteristics of such a tenancy. It was probably adopted from the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss2/4

16

et al.: The Tenant's Right of Redemption—Proposals for Modernizing the Re

19801

THE TENANT'S RIGHT OF REDEMPTION

mon law landlords. 93 Although the periodic tenancy retained the quality of infinite duration of the tenancy at will, the periodic tenancy
acquired substantially all of the other attributes of the tenancy for
94
years.
B.

The Nature of Tenancies in Minnesota

When the common law was codified in Minnesota, the Legislature did
not expressly recognize the periodic tenancy, recognizing only the tenancy at will and the tenancy for years. 95 The Territorial Legislature did,
however, impose notice requirements similar to those necessary to terminate a periodic estate on a landlord's ability to terminate the tenancy at
will.96 All estates that extended longer than a period of three months
were terminable on three month's notice.97 Tenancies existing for
shorter terms were terminable by notice equal to the length of time between payments of rent, except that any tenancy could be recovered on
fourteen day's notice for the nonpayment of rent. 98 The application of
this statute was limited by Smith a.Bell,99 in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court found that the statute was applicable only to the original
tenancy at will because the tenant was not entitled to receive notice of
termination0o0 Because the term "tenancy at will" as used by the Legislature was thought to contemplate periodic tenancies and not the original tenancy at will, the Smith decision posed the question of whether the
periodic tenancy was recognized in Minnesota, and if so, what its qualiexpressions of the courts that such a tenancy arose in the case of a "general
letting," that is when there was no specification of the duration of the tenancy.
I H. TIFFANY, supra note 31, § 14, at 119-20 (footnotes omitted).
93. See Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 2, 49 N.W. 327, 328 (1891) (tenancy from year to
year became well established and fully recognized in common law).
94. See notes 85-90 supra and accompanying text.
95. Chapter 43, section 1 of the territorial statutes provided: "Estates in lands are
divided into estates of inheritance, estates for life, estates for years, and estates at will and
by sufferance." MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 43, § 1 (1851) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 500.01 (1978)).
96. Id. ch. 49, § 34 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 504.06 (1978)).
97. See id. Section 34 required notice in the following language:
All estates at will or by sufferance, may be determined by either party, by three
month's notice given to the other party; and when the rent reserved in a lease at
will is payable at periods of less than three months, the time of such notice shall
be sufficient, if it be equal to the interval between the times of payment; and in
all cases of neglect or refusal to pay the rent due on a lease at will, fourteen day's
notice to quit, given in writing by the landlord to the tenant, shall be sufficient
to determine the lease.
Id. The notice requirement of section 34 was found to be applicable to both landlords and
tenants. See Grace v. Michaud, 50 Minn. 139, 140, 52 N.W. 390, 391 (1892).
98. See MINN. REV. TERR. STAT. ch. 49, § 34 (1851).
99. 44 Minn. 524, 47 N.W. 263 (1890), ovetrmledinpart, Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1,49
N.W. 327 (1891).
100. Id. at 525, 47 N.W. at 264.
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ties were. These questions were raised before the supreme court in the
case of Hunter v. Frost.10 1
In Hunter the landlord leased to the tenant a tenement for a term of
thirteen months with rent payable monthly. 0 2 At the expiration of the
term, the tenant continued in possession for five months and subsequently gave his landlord notice that he would vacate the premises at the
end of the following month. 0 3 After the tenant vacated the premises,
the landlord commenced an action for unpaid rent. The trial court
found the tenant's notice was insufficient to terminate the tenancy and
0
that the landlord was entitled to the rent due.1 4
On appeal the tenant argued his notice to quit was sufficient to terminate the tenancy because periodic tenancies had been abolished by implication when the Minnesota Legislature did not specifically recognize
them. 10 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, found the enumeration of tenancies adopted by the Legislature to be merely declaratory of
the common law and that periodic tenancies had clearly been established
by the common law courts. 10 6 In determining what type of estate the
periodic tenancy was, the court found the periodic estate had many characteristics of the estate for years.O 7 For purposes of the notice necessary
to terminate the estate, however, the court decided the periodic tenancy
was substantially a tenancy at will.108 Therefore, the court overruled its
decision in the Smith case.' 0 9 After Hunter it was clear that in Minnesota
a tenancy at will and a periodic tenancy were one and the same.110
101. 47 Minn. 1, 49 N.W. 327 (1891).
102. Id. at 1, 49 N.W. at 327.
103. At common law, if a tenant held over land after the expiration of the tenancy, he
became liable for another term under the same conditions. King v. Durkee-Atwood Co.,
126 Minn. 452, 454, 148 N.W. 297, 298 (1914); Quade v. Fitzloff, 93 Minn. 115, 116, 100
N.W. 660, 661 (1904); Stees v. Bergmeier, 91 Minn. 513, 516, 98 N.W. 648, 649 (1904).
The landlord, however, had the option to treat tenants as trespassers or as tenants at
sufferance and evict the tenant through summary process, or hold the tenant to another
term. King v. Durkee-Atwood Co., 126 Minn. at 455, 148 N.W. at 298; Smith v. Bell, 44
Minn. 524, 525, 47 N.W. 263, 264 (1890), overruled in part, Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49
N.W. 327 (1891). This common law provision has been altered by statute for urban leases.
See MINN. STAT. § 504.07 (1978) (tenant not liable for any period other than the shortest
interval between times of payment of rent under the terms of the lease).
104. Paper Book at 15-18, Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 49 N.W. 327 (1891).
105. See note 95 supra.
106. See Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. at 3-6, 49 N.W. at 328-29.
107. Id. at 5,.49 N.W. at 329.
108. Id. at 5-6, 49 N.W. at 329.
109. Id.
110. Many statutes, of course, have altered the periodic tenancy as it existed at common law by implying new conditions in the lease agreement. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 504.05 (1978) (rent liability for destroyed tenement); id. § 504.18 (statutory covenants of
habitability).
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The Impact of the Cafe Decision on Minnesota Law

In the Cafe decision, the court was faced with the question of whether
a periodic tenant could redeem his tenancy after termination for default
in the payment of rent. In resolving the issue, however, the court did not
consider that the tenancy at will had acquired substantially all of the
qualities of the tenancy for years.'
Nor did the court consider that
when notice is given to terminate the tenancy, the estate at will becomes
a tenancy for a fixed period of time.'12
The court found controlling the redemption statute's language 113 providing the tenant only with the right to be "restored to possession . . .
according to the terms of the original lease.", 14 According to the court,
the language of the statute indicated a legislative intent that redemption
rights were not designed to give a tenant a new and longer tenancy, but
to allow a tenant to redeem his former tenancy." 15 The intent of this
statute could be effectuated, the court reasoned, only when a lease provided for a fixed term.'" 6 The court concluded that the exercise of a
redemption right by a month-to-month tenant could, at most, restore the
tenant only to a periodic tenancy that could be terminated again at any
time in the future by proper notice.' 1 7 Thus, the tenant would be provided with little assistance by the use of the statute. 118 Consequently, the
court concluded that the periodic tenant was not entitled to the benefit
of statutory redemption.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE

Cafe Decision

The court's resolution of the problems presented in the Cafe case may
have been the best possible under Minnesota's outdated and piecemeal
landlord-tenant laws.119 The strength of the court's decision becomes
apparent from evaluating the consequences of a decison favoring New
111. See notes 86-90 supra and accompanying text.
112. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. The month to month tenancy is substantially the same as a tenancy for years once notice is given. For example, a month to
month tenancy with notice to quit given on June 30 for-termination on July 31 is identical
to a tenancy for years running for the thirty-two day period from June 30 to July 31. In
light of the considerations expressed herein and in note 111 supra, it appears the court
could have extended the right of redemption to peri6dic tenancies.
113. MINN. STAT. § 504.02 (1978). For the text of this statute, see note 21 supra.
114. 268 N.W.2d at 575.
115. Id.
116. A lease for a fixed term is one that will terminate on a date certain. See note 74
supra and accompanying text.
117. 268 N.W.2d at 574-75.
118. See id.
119. The age of many of Minnesota's landlord-tenant statutes is reflected in the fact
that they are still written contemplating the existence of a Justice of the Peace. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 566.09 (1978). The office of Justice of the Peace had not been utilized
actively in Minnesota for some years prior to its recent final abandonment. See Act of
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Riverside's redemption. Assuming New Riverside had the ability to redeem, the former tenancy could have been reinstated by merely paying
its back rent, five dollars in attorney's fees, and accrued interest and costs
of the action.120 UCP, on the other hand, would be responsible for bearing most of its own attorney's fees and the related costs incurred in attempting to recover possession of the leasehold.1 21 At any time in the
future, New Riverside could decide to withold rent and force UCP to
bring another unlawful detainer action. In a second unlawful detainer
action, UCP could again expect to bear the necessary legal fees and related costs. UCP might also anticipate having to meet every defense and
motion available to New Riverside in the original unlawful detainer action,122 in addition to the defense that the second proceeding was in re23
If UCP
taliation for the redemption of the lease by New Riverside.'
prevailed on the merits of the second unlawful detainer action, New RivJune 2, 1977, ch. 432, § 27, 1977 Minn. Laws 1147, 1161 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 487.35 (1978)).
The outdated statutes dealt with in this Comment are the basis for State Senator Jack
Davies' proposed Nonprimacy of Statutes Act. See Davies, 4 Response to Statutoq Obsolescence.- The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REv. 203 (1979). Senator Davies has proposed that statutes 20 years or older should be declared "mature," subject to limitation,
alteration, or even elimination by judicial decisions. See id. at 205.
120. See MINN. STAT. § 504.02 (1978).
121. See Appellants' Brief and Appendix at 23.
122. The answer to the complaint served by UCP in this action alleged nine affirmative defenses including: (1) defendant had not properly been served with process; (2)
plaintiff was not proper party to bring action; (3) plaintiff's complaint failed to state facts
which authorized recovery of possession; (4) rent agreement was materially breached by
plaintiff, (5) the plaintiff gave no valid notice to terminate the lease; (6) defendant was
withholding rent pursuant to agreement with plaintiff; (7) the termination of defendant's
tenancy by notice to quit was intended in whole or in part as a penalty for defendant's
good faith attempt to enforce its rights; (8) a certificate containing Cedar Riverside Land
Company's name and the names and addresses of the persons interested in its business had
not been filed with the Clerk of Hennepin County District Court; and (9) plaintiff maintains this action in its own name, solely in a representative capacity. Id. at A-4 to -9.
123. The retaliatory eviction defense is based upon clause 2 of subdivision 2 and subdivision 3 of Minnesota Statutes section 566.03. The statute provides as follows:
(2) [If the alleged termination of the lease] . . . was intended in whole or
part as a penalty for the defendant's good faith report to a governmental authority of the plaintiffs violation of any health, safety, housing or building codes or
ordinances.
If the notice to quit was served within 90 days of the date of any act of the
tenant coming within the terms of clauses (1) or (2) the burden of proving that
the notice to quit was not served in' whole or part for a retaliatory purpose shall
rest with the plaintiff.
Subd. 3. In any proceeding for the restitution of premises upon the ground
of nonpayment of rent, it shall be a defense thereto if the tenant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff increased the tenant's rent or
decreased the services as a penalty in whole or part for any lawful act of the
tenant as described in subdivision 2, providing that the tenant tender to the
court or to the plaintiff the amount of rent due and payable under his original
obligation.
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erside again would have the ability to redeem the lease.124
Under these circumstances, the difficulty in removing a tenant for the
nonpayment of rent is apparent. The tenant 'may be restored to his original lease, although the landlord must bear all but five dollars of his attorney's fees and related costs spent in prosecuting the action to recover the
premises.125 The five dollars paid to the landlord may have restored the
landlord to his original position when the fee was determined in 1905,126
but today payment of the sum is a symbolic gesture. This unfair burden
on landlords may eventually lead to the loss of a significant amount of
control by landlords over tenements, and ultimately may dissuade invest27
ments in rental housing.1
Although the Cafe decision may be the best possible resolution of the
issue under Minnesota's statutory scheme, the decision will have a harsh
impact on tenants. Contrary to the court's suggestion that a redemption
period is of little or no value to the tenant, the period of time is arguably
of significant value. In the event of a termination of a month-to-month
periodic tenancy for reasons other than the nonpayment of rent, the decision to terminate the tenancy and the duty to vacate may be separated
by as many as sixty days. 128 If, on the other hand, the lease is terminated
for the nonpayment of rent, only fourteen days separate the notice to
MINN. STAT. § 566.03, subd. 2(2)-subd. 3 (1978).
Subdivision 2 of section 566.03 was interpreted in Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307 Minn.
423, 240 N.W.2d 828 (1976). In that decision, the court articulated three important aspects of the penalty defense: first, the statute protects a wide range of tenant activity
provided such activity is undertaken in good faith for the purpose of enforcing contractual
or statutory rights; second, the statute requires the usual civil burden of proof; and third,
the statute aids the tenant with the presumption of retaliation which the landlord must
rebut if the notice to quit was served within 90 days of the tenant's protected activity. Id.
at 428-29, 240 N.W.2d at 831-32.
124. See Appellants' Brief and Appendix at 23-24.
125. See MINN. STAT. § 504.02 (1978).
126. See MINN. REV. LAws § 3328 (1905) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 504.02
(1978)).
127. Any reduction in the investment of rental housing could only aggravate the current rental housing shortage. See, e.g., notes 135-36 infra.
128. For example, if on July 2 a landlord wished to terminate a month to month periodic tenancy that begins on the first day of the month for reasons other than nonpayment
of rent and at that time served the tenant with a notice to quit, the tenant would be
entitled to the premises until August 31. See Oesterreicher v. Robertson, 187 Minn. 497,
501, 245 N.W. 825, 826 (1932) ("the rental month begins on the day the lease is made,
usually the day the rent is paid in advance for the month, and that it ends with the last
day of the rental month, we think it more in consonance with the practice in vogue to
hold, as stated, that a notice served on the first of a rental month is not in time to terminate the tenancy with the end of that month"); Petsch v. Biggs, 31 Minn. 392, 394, 18
N.W. 101, 103 (1884) ("Each month of the renting commenced on the first and terminated
on the last day of the month. And a notice served in time, requiring the tenant to quit on
the day when the month terminated, . . . was proper.").
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quit and the duty to vacate.12 9 For a commercial tenant in the renter's
market for a leasehold, this difference of forty-six days may be extremely
valuable. The value of the redemption right appears to be more significant to tenants with periodic leases having a duration greater than a
month.130 Leases with periodic tenancies that are based on quarterly
periods or those based on half-year periods could be terminated in the
same manner as the month-to-month lease in the Cafe case. 13 1 For these
tenants, the duty to vacate the premises under the fourteen-day notice
provision would be extremely harsh. 132 Application of the Cafe rule
withholds a valuable right that, if available, could extend the tenant's
33
leasehold for months.'
Perhaps the most discomforting impact of the Cafe decision may lie in
its application to residential tenants. Apartment dwellers seldom have
the knowledge or position that commercial tenants have to deal at arm's
length with landlords.13 4 Moreover, the periodic shortages of rental
housing and the high cost of moving present additional burdens for the
129. Section 566.09 allows the "justice" to immediately enter judgment for the plaintiff if he is entitled to the premises. See MINN. STAT. § 566.09 (1978). The justice shall
also issue a writ of restitution immediately unless defendant is able to make a showing of
substantial hardship. Id. Section 566.09 provides in full:
If, upon the trial, the justice or jury find for the plaintiff, the justice shall immediately thereupon enter judgment that the plaintiff have restitution of the premises, and tax the costs for him. The justice shall issue execution in favor of the
plaintiff for such costs, and also immediately issue a writ of restitution. No stay
of the writ of restitution may be granted except upon a showing by the defendant that the restitution would work a substantial hardship upon the defendant.
Upon a proper showing by the defendant of substantial hardship, the justice
may stay the writ of restitution for a reasonable period not to exceed seven days,
except that no stay of the writ of restitution shall extend later than three days
prior to the date the rent is next due. If the justice or jury shall find for the
defendant, he shall enter judgment for the defendant, tax the costs against the
plaintiff, and issue execution therefor.
Id.
130. Periodic tenancies may of course have any length of time as their period of time.
See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
131. Although leases for a term exceeding one year must be evidenced by a writing,
MINN. STAT. § 513.04 (1978), periodic tenancies are not affected by the Statute of Frauds.
Hunter v. Frost, 47 Minn. 1, 6, 49 N.W. 327, 329 (1891).
132. As long as the tenancy is classified as a tenancy at will, or a periodic tenancy, the
lease may be terminated by the two week notice for nonpayment of rent. See MINN. STAT.
§ 504.06 (1978).
133. See notes 128, 130 supra and accompanying text.
134. Residential tenants historically have been treated with greater consideration than
commercial tenants by courts and by legislatures. For example, the following Minnesota
statutes apply exclusively to residential tenants: MINN. STAT. § 504.20 (1978) (security
deposits); id. § 504.21 (restrictions in automatic renewals of leases); id. § 504.22 (landlord
disclosure requirements); id. § 566.175 (unlawful removal remedy); 1d. § 566.18-.33 (tenant remedy for code violations).
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low and middle income tenant. 135 These problems become even more
acute for tenants whose rent payments are contributed to by a government subsidy. With replacement housing for low income tenants almost
nonexistent,136 and with no ability to control the timely arrival of a subsistence check, application of the Cafe decision to this group of tenants is
very harsh.
Thus, in light of the Cafe decision, if a tenant holds anything other
than a tenancy for years, he will have no right of redemption in the event
his lease is terminated for the nonpayment of rent.13 7 Accordingly, a
periodic tenant may not rely upon a redemption right for locating alternative shelter or repairing damaged relations with the landlord.13 8
V.

A

PROPOSAL

Many of the shortcomings similar to those present in Minnesota's current redemption statute have been remedied in other states by legislation. The scope of the redemption right and the conditions precedent to
a tenant's right to redeem, however, vary substantially among states.
Statutes in some jurisdictions provide for a grace period after the rent has
become due during which an action for recovery of possession is barred
for a certain length of time, while notice, or a demand for rent, is served
on the tenant.' 3 9 Other jurisdictions provide for the abatement of the
135. The Department of Planning and Economic Development of St. Paul has released
the following statistics:
1. In the City of St. Paul multiple family rental vacancy rates have been 3.84.2%. Six percent is considered adequate to have a choice in rental property.
2. Seventeen percent of St. Paul Households are classified "inadequately
housed" because they are paying more than 25% of their income for rent.

3.

Only 297 multi-family units have been built in St. Paul since 1978.

St. Paul Housing Information Office, Housing Observations December 1979, at 1.

136. Recently released statistics on subsidized housing in St. Paul are demonstrative of
a housing crisis for low-income tenants:
The St. Paul Public Housing Rental Office presently has 578 qualified nonelderly persons and/or families on their waiting list for entrance into public
housing. There are 293 qualified elderly waiting for entrance.
On St. Paul Public Housing's Section 8 rent subsidy waiting list there are
280 non-elderly persons and/or families and 29 elderly persons or families awaiting certificates.
A random sample of other subsidized housing (other than public housing)
shows 75-80 families on the waiting list for Liberty Plaza, 45 persons waiting for
one or two bedroom units at 1247 St. Anthony, 128 families waiting for two and
three bedroom units at Coventry, 169 elderly waiting for Winslow Apartments.

These buildings are either 236 federally assisted or MHFA assisted. Our files
show that the length of these waiting lists have [sic] been consistent during the

past year and a half.
Id. at 1-2.
137. See notes 111-18 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 129-36 supra and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.20 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (three days notice
required); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 8 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (five day demand for rent re-
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landlord's action for possession if the tenant tenders the rent due, costs,
and in some instances, attorney's fees. 140
Ideally, a well-drafted statute should balance the landlord's right to
control his tenements against the tenant's right to preserve his leasehold.
A modern statute should weigh the landlord's expense in initiating the
eviction process, against the tenant's past history of nonpayment of rent,
the tenant's ability to make timely payments, and the tenant's reasons for
the nonpayment of rent.
A.

The Massachusetts Law

A statutory scheme that effectively balances the interest of landlords
and tenants in extending the right of redemption to tenants at will has
been adopted in Massachusetts.14, The Massachusetts law provides tenants at will with an opportunity to defeat a notice to quit by tendering to
the landlord the sum of rent owed within ten days after receipt of the
notice.14 2 The opportunity to restore the lease, however, is limited. The
tenant may redeem only if he has not been served by the landlord with a
quired); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 441 (Vernon 1973) (three day demand for rent required); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1431(2) (1976) (three day demand for rent required); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 34-18-9 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (landlord may bring action in ejectment or trespass if rent
unpaid for 15 days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-16-2 (1979) (three day demand for
rent required); VA. CODE § 55-225 (1974) (must give five days notice for possession or
payment); Wyo. STAT. § 1-21-1002 (1977) (tenant must fail to pay rent for three days).
140. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.690 (1973) (tenant must pay back rent and costs
before judgment); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1368(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980)
(tenant must pay back rent cost, costs, and attorney's fees before judgment); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 1174, 1179 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (tenant must show hardship, apply
for relief within 30 days of judgment, pay back rent, costs, and attorney's fees); GA. CODE
ANN. § 61-309 (1979) (if rent is tendered seven days after delivery of summons, action shall
cease); IDAHO CODE § 6-316 (1979) (tenant must pay cost of proceeding and amount of
judgment within five days after entry); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401 (Cum. Supp.
1979) (tenant may tender back rent, cost, and fees before eviction order is issued); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 11 (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (tenant must tender back rent,
interest, and costs before answer is due); NEv. REV. STAT. § 40.360 (1975) (tenant must

pay into court amount of judgment and costs five days after entry of judgment); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-55 (West 1952) (before entry of final judgment tenant must pay to
court rent and costs of proceeding); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 732(2) (McKinney

Cum. Supp. 1979) (tenant has five days after judgment to pay rent and costs); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.12.190 (1961) (relief may be granted if applied within 30 days of
forfeiture); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-22 (1966) (if payment of rent, costs, and interests, action
will cease).
141. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 12 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
142. Id. The statute provides in part:
In case of neglect or refusal to pay the rent from a tenant at will, fourteen
days' notice to quit, given in writing by the landlord to the tenant, shall be
sufficient to determine the tenancy; provided, that the tenancy of a tenant who
has not received a similar notice from the landlord within the twelve months
next preceeding the receipt of such notice shall not be determined if the tenant,
within ten days after the receipt thereof, pays or tenders to the landlord, the
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similar notice to quit in the previous twelve months. 14 3 The Massachusetts law also provides for two common problems associated with redemption in a unique fashion. First, every notice to quit for nonpayment
of rent must bear the legend:
[i]f you have not received a notice to quit for nonpayment of rent
within the last twelve months, you have a right to prevent termination
of your tenancy by paying or tendering to your landlord, your landlord's attorney or the person to whom you customarily pay your rent
the full amount of rent due within ten days after your receipt of this
notice. 144
This notice serves the vital function of informing the tenant of the right
to reinstate the lease before the period of redemption has expired. Second, the statutory scheme provides that if the delay in the payment of
rent is the result of the failure of a government agency to mail on time a
subsistence allowance, the court in any action for possession shall furnish
notice of the action to the appropriate agency, and continue the hearing
for a period of not less than seven days. 145 If, before possession is delivered, the tenant tenders to the landlord the rent, interest, and cost of the
1 46
suit, the tenancy will not be terminated.
B.

A ProposalforMinnesota

In light of the partial reform of Minnesota's statute accomplished by
the court in the Cafe decision and the developments in the redemption
laws of other states, this Comment proposes six amendments to the present law. First, it is proposed that section 504.02,147 which controls the
redemption requirements for a tenancy for years, be amended to conform
the statute with the contemporary practice of landlords and tenants.
The redemption statute should no longer require the existence of a right
of reentry on behalf of the landlord before a tenant may have the right to
redeem. This amendment only recognizes what was accomplished by the
landlord's attorney, or the person to whom the tenant customarily pays rent, the
full amount of any rent due.

Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The statute provides:
If the neglect or refusal to pay the rent due was caused by a failure or delay
of the federal government, the commonwealth or any municipality, or any departments, agencies or authorities thereof, in the mailing or delivery of any subsistence or rental payment, check or voucher other than a salary payment to
either the tenant or the landlord, the court in any action for possession shall
continue the hearing not less than seven days in order to furnish notice of such
action to the appropriate agency and shall, if all rent due with interest and costs
of suit has been tendered to the landlord within such time, treat the tenancy as
not having been terminated.
Id.
146. Id.
147. MINN. STAT. § 504.02 (1978). This statute is reprinted in part at note 21 supra.
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48
court in the Cafe decision.1
Second, this Comment proposes that section 504.02 be amended to
foreclose the possibility of abuse of the statute to harass landlords
through the consecutive use of redemptions.14 9 To cure this potential for
abuse, it is proposed that redemption be available only to a tenant for
years who has not been served with a summons for the nonpayment of
rent from the landlord in a twelve month period preceding the initiation
1
of the action to which the redemption statute would otherwise apply. 5o
In addition, the five dollar limit on attorney's fees should be stricken in
favor of a provision requiring the tenant to compensate the landlord for
reasonable attorney's fees.151 By limiting the times a tenant can withhold rent and by placing on the tenant the burden to restore the landlord
to his original position, the tenant will be less likely to use rent withhold15 3
52
or to increase his cash flow.
ing as a form of economic warfare

148. 268 N.W.2d at 575 (right of reentry no longer prerequisite to redemption).
149. See notes 120-24 supra and accompanying text. Although the hypothetical scenario of events set forth earlier was designed to demonstrate the potential for abusing the
redemption of tenancies at will, the redemption of tenancies for years may be abused in a
similar fashion. See 614 Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 297 Minn. 395, 211 N.W.2d 891
(1973). In 614 Co. the plaintiff leased a warehouse to D.H. Overmyer. The lease provided
for monthly payments of a stated amount of rent and, as additional rent, tax escrow payments. D.H. Overmyer regularly failed to pay the amount of rent when due. Id. at 396,
211 N.W.2d at 893. The failure of D.H. Overmyer to pay the rent when due was an event
of default under the lease, and 614 Company instituted an unlawful detainer action to
recover the premises. Id. The trial court found that notwithstanding the fact that D.H.
Overmyer had deliberately failed to pay the rent when due, recovery of the premises
would be denied if D.H. Overmyer chose to redeem the lease. On appeal, the trial court's
decision was affirmed. Id.
150. Two statutes similar to this proposal are cited at note 156 infra.
151. Some states require the tenant to tender attorney's fees to the landlord or to the
court. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1368(B) (Cum. Supp. 1979); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1179 (West 1972). Other states allow the court to award attorney's fees. See, e.g., MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
A possible amendment to section 504.02 providing for the proposed changes might
read as follows:
[504.02] Effect of Payment of Rent; Cancellation of Leases in Certain Cases;
Abandonment or Surrender of Possession.
In the case of real property and at an, time before possession has been delivered to the plaintiff, if the lessee or his successor in interest as to the whole or any
part of the property pays to the plaintiff, or brings into court the amount of rent
then in arrears, with interest and costs of the action, and reasonable attorney's
fees, and performs the other covenants on the part of the lessee, any proceedings
for the recovery of the lands shall cease and the lessee shall hold the land as
before the proceeding began. This subdivision does not apply to any tenant who
has received more than two summons containing copies of complaints filed by
the lanalord against the tenant for rent due and unpaid in the 12 months prior
to the initiation of the appeal to which the subdivision would otherwise apply.
152. The dispute between the landlord and tenant in the Cafe decision was characterized by plaintiff in the following paragraph:
The Tenants' Union professes to see this whole process as a type of "economic
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Third, it is proposed that section 504.06, which provides for the termination of tenancies at will, be amended to allow a periodic tenant to
redeem his leasehold in the event of a default. Specifically, the tenant
should be allowed to defeat the notice to quit for nonpayment of rent if
the rent due is tendered during the notice period.15 4 Simply receiving
the rent late should not give the landlord the right to terminate the lease.
The period of the notice to quit, however, should be reduced from fourteen days to seven. 1 5 5 This amendment is justified because if the tenant
chooses not to redeem his leasehold, he should not be allowed to detain
the property. Moreover, tenants should not be allowed to abuse the redemption privilege and should lose their ability to redeem if they have
warfare" akin to labor union-management negotiations. In fact under the present circumstances, it is much more like "economic blackmail." When a labor
union calls a strike, it sets out to hurt the employer enough to bring him to the
bargaining table; but in the process, the union members are also hurt when their
paychecks stop. The economic pressure which the strike puts on both sides forces
both to the bargaining table to hammer out their differences. But in the landlord-tenant context, only the landlord is hurt by a rent strike; the tenant, who is
no longer paying rent, is even better off than before. If the landlord were to sue
for the rent, he would expend substantial attorney's fees to achieve a result that
would be no worse, from the tenant's standpoint, than if the rent strike had
never begun. Thus, the only real counterpressure the landlord can apply is to
begin to terminate tenancies for nonpayment of rent. This puts very real pressure on the striking tenants, but also is quite costly for the landlord, setting up a
countervailing pressure that should result in negotiations.
Appellants' Brief and Appendix at 24 n.22 (emphasis in oringinal).
The supreme court had earlier rejected a bid to adopt the analagous law of labor
relations in the management of landlord-tenant disputes. See U.C.P.I. v. Norton, 311
Minn. 18, 25-26, 246 N.W.2d 858, 862 (1976). Commentators, however, have suggested a
variety of function changes in the landlord-tenant relationship via tenant unions. Seegenerally Bazarko, Tenants Umon:" Legal Rights of Members, 18 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 358 (1969);
Moskovitz & Hinigsberg, The Tenant-Union-Landlord Relations Act. A Proposal, 58
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1013 (1970); Note, Tenant Unions. Their Law and Operation in the State and
the Nation, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 79 (1970); Note, Tenant Unions." Collective Bargatnig and the
Low-Income Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368 (1968).
153. Failure to pay rent when due in order to increase the tenant's cash flow appears to
account for the tardy payments of rent in the 614 Co. case. The record of 614 Co. provided
in part:
[Counsel for D.H. Overmyer] . . .stated that Overmyer owned and leased
large numbers of warehouses throughout the United States, deliberately paid all
of its rent late and deliberately withheld payment of taxes whenever possible.
This was said to be due to the rapid expansion of the company and the resulting
severe under-capitalization. The late payments provided necessary working capital for Overmyer. . .and [counsel] made it perfectly clear to me that Overmyer
would not make timely rent and tax payments in the future.
Record at 40, 614 Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 297 Minn. 395, 211 N.W.2d 891 (1973).
154. This provision would be similar to that used in Massachusetts, see notes 142-43
supra and accompanying text.
155. This amendment would bring the length of notice to quit in Minnesota in line
with that of many other states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1368(B) (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (seven days notice); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN § 554:134 (1967) (seven days
notice); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:3 (1974) (seven days notice).
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received a similar notice to quit from the landlord in the preceeding
6
twelve-month period.15
Fourth, along the lines of Massachusetts' redemption statute, it is proposed that Minnesota adopt a mandatory legend in every notice to quit
for nonpayment of rent informing the tenant of his right of redemption.
The absence of this notice in Minnesota's present statute limits the signif157
icance of the right to the vast majority of tenants.
This Comment's fifth proposal would require that Minnesota deal
with tenants' dependency on governmental subsistence relief in a manner
similar to that adopted in Massachusetts.15 8 Certainly, people who fail
to pay their rent in a timely fashion because their subsistence funding has
been delayed through the disorganization of ihe government deserve special consideration. Extending the opportunity to redeem, requiring the
court to notify the appropriate government agency, and requiring the
tenant to compensate the landlord for his costs in initiating the action for
nonpayment of rent appear to fairly balance the interests of tenant, land59
lord, and state.1

Finally, it is proposed that tenants under written and oral periodic
leases have the opportunity to redeem their tenancy before possession has
been delivered to the landlord. To prevent tenants from asserting a
right of redemption after the proceeding for possession would strongly
discourage the assertion of tenant defenses.1 6 If the tenant should pro156. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 12 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Subsection e of section 8-401 of the
Maryland statutes provides:
In any action of summary ejectment for failure to pay rent where the landlord is awarded a judgment giving him restitution of the leased premises, the
tenant shall have the right to redemption of the leased premises. . . . This subsection does not apply to any tenant who has received more than three summons
containing copies of complaints filed by the landlord against the tenant for rent
due and unpaid in the 12 months prior to the initiation of the action to which
this subsection otherwise would apply.
Id. § 8-401(e).
157. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text.
159. See id.
160. An interesting question that arises from the Cafe decision is the impact, if any, the
decision will have on a tenant asserting breach of the covenant of habitability as a defense
to an unlawful detainer action. This defense was established in the case of Fritz v.
Warthen, 298 Minn, 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973).
Fritz involved a tenant-defendant who held a morfth to month residential lease with
the landlord-plaintiff. The tenant alleged that the substandard condition of his leasehold
prevented his full enjoyment of the premises. Although the tenant served the landlord
with notice of the substandard features of his apartment, the landlord failed to remedy the
problems. The tenant then withheld a portion of the rent which would compensate for
the interference with his leasehold. Consequently, the landlord brought an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent. The trial court found in favor of the landlord.
On appeal, the tenant-defendant advocated that the landlord's breach of the implied
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ceed to defend his claim on the merits, however, redemption should be
conditioned on the tender to the landlord of the accrued rent, interest,
cost, and attorney's fees. This condition would be consistent with the
policy that favors restoring the landlord to his original position before
default. 161
covenant of habitability in the lease was a proper defense to an unlawful detainer action.
Id. at 54-56, 213 N.W.2d at 340. In resolving whether a breach of the covenant of habitability could validly be asserted as a defense to an unlawful detainer action, the court
reasoned that under Minnesota law the implied covenants of habitability and the covenants for payment of rent were mutually dependent. Thus, the rent could not become due
according to the terms of the lease if the landlord had breached the implied covenants. Id.
at 58-59, 213 N.W.2d at 341-43.
The question posed by the Cafe case is whether the defense of breach of the covenant
of habitability will be undercut by placing a periodic tenant who asserts the defense in an
"at risk" position. This "at risk" position may arise if a month to month tenant withholds
rent because he believes the landlord has violated the covenant of habitability, see MINN.
STAT. § 504.18 (1978), and subsequently has his lease terminated for the nonpayment of
rent. See MINN. STAT. § 504.06 (1978). If the landlord should seek to recover the premises
through an unlawful detainer proceeding and the tenant is unable to prove his defense,
the Cafe case would appear to dictate that the tenant has no right to possession. This
result would follow from the fact that his lease has been terminated and there is no right of
redemption. See notes 111-18 supra and accompanying text.
It is difficult to imagine, however, that the supreme court would undercut the strong
state policy expressed in the Friz decision sub silento. The court could easily distinguish
the Cafe case from the Fritz case on the basis of a commercial-residential distinction.
Nonetheless, it appears difficult to justify allowing residential tenants the opportunity to
redeem under the reasoning of the Cafe decision for a purpose other than preserving the
strong state interest in habitable housing.
161. A possible amendment to section 504.06 providing for the proposed changes
might read as follows:
[504.061 Estates at will may be determined by either party b' three months'
notice in writing for that purpose given to the other party, and, when the rent
reserved is payable at periods of less than three months, the time of such notice
shall be sufficient if it be equal to the interval between the times of payment;
and, in all cases of neglect or refusal to pay the rent due on a lease at will, seven
days' notice in writing to quit, given by the landlord to the tenant, is sufficient to
determine the lease, provided that the tenancy of a tenant who has not received
a similar notice from the landlord within the twelve months next preceding the
receipt of such notice shall not be determined if the tenant, within ten days after
the receipt thereof, pays or tenders to the landlord, the landlord' s attorney, or
the person to whom the tenant customarily pays the rent, the full amount of any
rent due. Every notice to determine an estate at will for nonpayment of rent
shall contain the following notification to the tenant: "If You have not received a
notice to quit for nonpayment of rent within the last twelve months, you have a
right to prevent termination of your tenancy by paying or tendering to your
landlord, your landlord's attorney or the person to whom you customarily pay
your rent the full amount of rent due within ten days after y'our receipt of this
notice." I any notice to determine an estate at will [for nonpayment of rent
shall fail to contain such notification, the time within which the tenant receiving
the notice would be entitled to pay or tender rent pursuant to this section shall
be extended to the day the answer is due in anyX action by the landlord to recover
possession of the premises. Failure to include such notice shall not otherwise
affect the validity of the said notice. It the neglect or refusal to pay the rent was
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CONCLUSION

The Cafe decision acknowledges that the redemption statute no longer
reflects the practices of modern landlords and tenants. The court's holding that a reentry clause is no longer a prerequisite to redemption, however, is not a sufficient reform of the statute. Accordingly, the
Legislature should reconsider the current law and provide relief for tenants from default for the nonpayment of rent while fairly balancing the
privileges and obligations of landlords. Because the primary shortcoming of the current law is that it considers the tenant's ability to redeem by
reference to the estate the tenant would hold at common law, a statutory
scheme that looks to the willingness of the tenant to restore the landlord
to his original position is better suited to balance the interest of landlord
and tenant. It is hoped that the legislation proposed in this Comment
will assist the Legislature in reforming Minnesota's redemption statute.
caused by a failure or delay of the federal government, the state of Minnesota or
any municipality, or any departments, agencies or authorities thereof, in the
mailing or delivery of any subsistence or rental payment, check or voucher other
than a salary payment to either the tenant or the landlord, the court in any
action for possession shall continue the hearing not less than seven days in order
to furnish notice of such action to the appropriatq agency and shall, if all rent
due with interest and costs of suit has been tendered to the landlord within such
time, treat the tenancy as not having been terminated.
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